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Contemporary
authoritarianism, while not having entirely abandoned the aims and methods of its
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ancestors, has been undergoing a reinvention in recent years. It no longer attacks
democracy and the rule of law upfront but instead tries to adopt the language and
even (at least nominally) the institutions of democratic constitutionalism to promote
its autocratic aims from within. The two EU Member States where this new-school
authoritarianism is most advanced are Hungary and Poland: Popular elections
are being held; frantic law-making is taking place; constitutional and other courts
keep handing down judgments – but each of these democratic and rule of law
institutions have been successfully turned into tools of a self-proclaimed, rawly
majoritarian “will of the people“. Populist authoritarian leaders claim exclusive
moral representation of the people to undercut the role of the legislature, judiciary
and other democratic institutions. Therefore, rejecting political pluralism and anti-
constitutionalism differentiate populist authoritarians from democrats.
What lessons does the plight of the Polish and the Hungarian democracy hold for a
seemingly stable constitutional state like Germany? How resilient would the German
constitutional setup turn out to be in the case of an authoritarian majority taking and
successfully holding on to power? What kind of legal or institutional changes may
be helpful to make that event less likely and/or less hard to prevent? These were
the questions we aimed to address in a debate jointly organized by Verfassungsblog
and WZB Center for Global Constitutionalism, generously supported by Stiftung
Mercator.
Our aim was to study the activities of the governments in emerging new-school
authoritarian systems and the respective constitutional rules and conventions
that were or were not in place to prevent or hinder its ascent. We also  compared
them with the German legal and constitutional system in order to sharpen our
distinctiveness and to identify possible deficiencies while the necessary societal and
political consensus required to fix them is still there. To approach that aim, we have
invited a wide range of experts from Poland and Hungary to a workshop in Berlin
in order to discuss with their German counterparts under Chatham House rules the
conditions of success of new-school authoritarianism in their respective legal and
constitutional frameworks.
The workshop started with an opening plenary session to discuss the concept and
the attributes of constitutional resilience, and the relation of positive constitutional
rules and cultural habits and traditions in the prevention of democratic backsliding.
Subsequently, the workshop broke into three separate, parallel workshop panels
where experts from Hungary/Poland and Germany discussed the experiences made
and the lessons to be learned in their respective fields of expertise: I) Constitutional
Courts / Judiciary / Prosecution, II) Free Speech / Media / Civil Society, and III)
Electoral System / Party Regulation / Opposition Rights.
The results will be published in an online symposium on Verfassungsblog over
the next days: MATTIAS KUMM and CHRISTOPH GRABENWARTER sharpen
the contours of the concept of constitutional resilience. GÁBOR ATTILA TÓTH
and SUSAN ROSE ACKERMAN illuminate the relation of rules and traditions/
conventions in terms of constitutional resilience. MICHAELA HAILBRONNER
outlines the results of the debate in the first panel on courts and the prosecution,
MATHIAS HONG does the same regarding the second panel about media and civil
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society, and ANNA VON NOTZ summarizes the debate in the third panel on political
competition. JELENA VON ACHENBACH, DIETER GRIMM and SUJIT CHOUDHRY
comment.
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